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Abstract 
Slave societies such as Jamaica were among the earliest regions to adopt new 
technologies, suggesting that slavery was not synonymous with economic 
backwardness.  This article uses the efforts of the Falmouth Water Company to adopt 
the new hydraulic ram between 1799 and 1805 to show that this process was also not 
restricted to the plantation sector and that the island possessed an unexpected capacity 
for technological adaption.  This was based on local skills in mechanical and civil 
engineering derived from the plantation sector, and wider political and financial 
background that supported innovation when the right conditions were in place. 
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The first steam engine in the Americas was erected in New Jersey at the Schuyler 
Copper Mine in 1753.  The second was set up in Jamaica in 1768 to grind sugar cane 
produced by slaves, making the West Indies one of the earliest regions outside Europe 
to embrace this powerful new technology.1  Noel Deerr, Veront Satchell and Jennifer 
                                                 
1 Noel Deerr and Alexander Brooks, ‘The early use of steam power in the cane sugar industry’, 
Transactions of the Newcomen Society, 21 (1940) pp. 11-21; Veront Satchell, ‘Early use of steam 
power in the Jamaican sugar industry, 1768-1810’, Transactions of the Newcomen Society, 67 (1995) 
pp. 221-31; Jennifer Tann, ‘Steam and sugar: the diffusion of the stationary steam engine to the 
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Tann, among others, have shown that the process was one of innovation and adaption 
as well as adoption.  ‘Experimentation took place’, notes Satchell, for example, ‘… 
[and] planters themselves were actively investigating, seeking further information and 
actually adapting steam engines on their estates’, such as by increasing the size of 
boilers in steam engines to burn cane trash rather than coal.2  These findings have 
undermined established views of the British West Indies as technological backwaters 
and failed societies and contributed to a wider reassessment of the links between 
slavery and industrialisation.3  Dale Tomich, Richard Follett, Robert Gudmestad and 
many others have challenged the wider orthodoxy established by Eugene Genovese 
that all slavery was incompatible with technological innovation, and shown that 
inventions such as the steam engine and the vacuum pan were eagerly adopted by 
planters in Saint Domingue, Cuba and Louisiana from the late eighteenth century 
onwards.4  Yet the focus so far has been almost wholly on the plantation sector.  A 
                                                 
Caribbean sugar industry, 1770-1840’, History of Technology, 19 (1997) pp. 63-84.  For a wider study 
of steam engine diffusion, see Jennifer Tann and M.J. Breckin, ‘The international diffusion of the Watt 
Engine, 1775-1825’, Economic History Review, 31 (1978) pp. 541-64. 
2 Satchell, ‘Early use of steam power’, pp. 221-31 
3 Richard B. Sheridan, ‘Changing sugar technology and the labour nexus in the British Caribbean, 
1750-1900, with special reference to Barbados and Jamaica’, Nieuwe West-Indische Gids / New West 
Indian Guide, 63 (1989) pp. 59-93.  For examples of older interpretations, see Lowell J. Ragatz, The 
fall of the planter class in the British Caribbean, 1763-1833: a study in social and economic history 
(New York; London; The Century Co, 1928) pp. 62-80; Gisela Eisner, Jamaica, 1830-1930: a study in 
economic growth (Manchester; Manchester University Press, 1961) pp. 296-8 
4 Peter Boomgaard and Gert J. Oostindie, ‘Changing sugar technology and the labour nexus: the 
Caribbean, 1750-1900’, Nieuwe West-Indische Gids / New West Indian Guide, 63 (1989) pp. 3-22; Dale 
W. Tomich, Slavery in the circuit of sugar: Martinique and the world economy, 1830-1848 (Baltimore, 
MD; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990) pp. 189-213; Jonathan Curry-Machado, Cuban sugar 
‘Falmouth Water Company’ 
3 
 
close study of the Falmouth Water Company of Jamaica and its efforts to introduce 
the hydraulic ram into the island between 1799 and 1805 develops this further and 
confirms that societies built on slavery were able to adopt and adapt technology in 
areas not directly connected to this part of their economy, and that they therefore 
possessed an unexpectedly broad capacity for technological innovation.   
This matters because slave societies have been an important test for wider 
theories of technological innovation and diffusion.  Robert Allen argues that the rise 
of technology was a product of demand and that high wages in Britain encouraged 
manufacturers to adopt new machines that reduced labour requirements and saved 
money.5  By contrast, Joel Mokyr has argued that innovation reflected the unique 
supply of human capital of British society, which encouraged and allowed inventors 
to translate their ideas into reality.6  Studies of technological diffusion have relied on 
similar calculations of supply and demand.  Doron Ben Atar and Ross Thomson used 
‘epidemic theory’ to argue that diffusion reflected growing knowledge of new 
inventions, but others would accept Nathan Rosenberg’s conclusion that diffusion 
                                                 
industry: transnational networks and engineering migrants in mid-nineteenth century Cuba (New 
York; Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) pp. 23-47; Richard J. Follett, The sugar masters: planters and slaves 
in Louisiana's cane world, 1820-1860 (Baton Rouge; Louisiana State University Press, 2005) pp. 14-
45; James McClellan, Colonialism and science: Saint Domingue and the Old Regime (Chicago; 
University of Chicago Press, 2010) pp. 63-74; Robert Gudmestad, ‘Technology and the world the 
slaves made’, History Compass, 4 (2006) pp. 373-83  
5 Robert C. Allen, The British industrial revolution in global perspective (Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press, 2009)  
6 Joel Mokyr, The enlightened economy: Britain and the industrial revolution 1700-1850 (London; 
Penguin, 2009)  
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reflected a balance of supply and demand that shifted continually during this period.7  
All agree that by reducing wages and misusing human capital, slave societies had 
fewer incentives to innovate and so did not industrialise.8  More recently though, 
Gudmestad and others have concluded that slave societies innovated widely but in 
different ways because they faced a different balance of supply and demand; 
‘slavery’, he argues, ‘served as a filter for economic choices’.9   Planters across the 
Americas therefore favoured and supported new technologies such as the cotton gin or 
the vacuum pan that could increase the efficiency and output of the plantation system 
without undermining the social and racial divisions that held the enslaved population 
in check.  What remains unclear is how far this was true outside the main plantation 
sector and thus the capacity of societies such as Jamaica to embrace technological 
solutions to other local social and economic problems. 
                                                 
7 Nathan Rosenberg, ‘Factors affecting the diffusion of technology’, Explorations in Economic History, 
10 (1972) pp. 3-33; Jayati Sarkar, ‘Technological diffusion: alternative theories and historical 
evidence’, Journal of Economic Surveys, 12 (1998) pp. 131-76; P.A. Geroski, ‘Models of technology 
diffusion’, Research Policy, 29 (2000) pp. 603-25; Claude Diebolt, Tapas Mishra, and Mamata Parhi, 
Dynamics of distribution and diffusion of new technology: a contribution to the historical, economic 
and social route of a developing economy (London; Springer, 2016) pp. 15-44.  For Thomson and Ben 
Atar, see Doron Ben-Atar, Trade secrets: intellectual piracy and the origins of American industrial 
power (New Haven, CT; Yale University Press, 2004); Ross Thomson, Structures of change in the 
mechanical age: technological innovation in the United States, 1790-1865 (Baltimore, MD; Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2009)  
8 See above n. 4 and Susanna Delfino and Michele Gillespie, ‘Introduction’, in idem (eds), Technology, 
innovation and Southern industrialization: from the antebellum era to the computer age (Columbia, 
MO; University of Missouri Press, 2008) pp. 1-8; Gudmestad ‘Technology’ pp. 373-83. 
9 Gudmestad, ‘Technology’ p. 380. 
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The Falmouth Water Company is an apt focus for this study because, as Leslie 
Tomory has recently concluded, utility companies such as waterworks were important 
centres for technological innovation and diffusion in Britain and North America 
during the eighteenth century.10  ‘The intensification of network-supplied water into 
homes in London moved this most mundane of consumer goods into a commercial 
market’, he notes, ‘[which was] run by companies and made possible by technological 
innovation’.11  In North America, waterworks in New York in 1774 and Philadelphia 
in 1799 were some of the first ventures to embrace technology and replace horse-mills 
and waterwheels with steam engines.12  By 1818, for example, there were two steam 
engines at Fairmont near Philadelphia capable of pumping three million gallons of 
water per day, and Darwin Stapleton has argued that they became an important vector 
for the transfer of engineering skills.  The letters from the waterworks in Falmouth to 
Boulton and Watt suggest that the slave society of Jamaica could likewise support the 
diffusion of the new hydraulic technologies, and that even the innate caution of local 
planters could be overcome by useful innovations that promised greater productivity 
                                                 
10 Leslie Tomory, ‘London's water supply before 1800 and the roots of the networked city’, Technology 
and Culture, 56 (2015) pp. 704-37; Leslie Tomory, ‘Water technology in eighteenth-century London: 
the London Bridge Waterworks’, Urban History, 42 (2015) pp. 381-404.  For an overview of the 
history of London's water supply, see John Graham-Leigh, London's water wars: the competition for 
London's water supply in the nineteenth century (London; Francis Boutle, 2000) pp. 3-36 
11 Tomory, ‘London's water supply’, p. 713 
12 Nelson Manfred Blake, Water for the cities: a history of the urban water supply problem in the 
United States (Syracuse, NY; Syracuse University Press, 1956) pp. 78-83; Gerard T. Koeppel, Water for 
Gotham: a history (Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press, 2000) pp. 36-49; Darwin H. Stapleton, 
The transfer of early industrial technologies to America (Philadelphia, PA; American Philosophical 
Society, 1987) pp. 59-71. 
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or efficiency, especially at a time when high prices for sugar were encouraging 
planters to look for ways to increase production by developing marginal lands.  Put 
simply, the experience of the Falmouth Water Company shows that slave societies 
such as Jamaica had much the same human and social resources to innovate and 
industrialise as either England or New England, and could do so when the supply of 
labour and innovations and the demand for each were closely enough aligned to offer 
a sufficient incentive to inventors or importers of technology. 
 
-I- 
 
Although settlement in Jamaica was initially concentrated in the south-eastern part of 
the island, the northern and western frontiers were steadily opened up from the early 
eighteenth century, and ports such as Savanna-la-Mar, Lucea and Montego Bay had 
developed by the late eighteenth century as important outlets for plantation produce.13  
The parish of Trelawney was created in 1770 and its capital placed inland at Martha 
Brae, but it soon became clear that the parish needed a coastal settlement to support 
the export of sugar, molasses, rum and coffee, and the town of Falmouth was founded 
in the 1790s for this purpose.  ‘It has of late increased in population and building[s] to 
an extraordinary degree’, one resident wrote in 1799, ‘and is in aspect of trade and 
                                                 
13 Nadine Hunt, ‘Expanding the frontiers of western Jamaica through minor Atlantic ports in the 
eighteenth century’, Canadian Journal of History, 45 (2010) pp. 485-502.  Richard B. Sheridan, Sugar 
and slavery: an economic history of the British West Indies, 1623-1775 (London; Caribbean University 
Press, 1974) pp. 208-33, 459-62; Dan Ogilvie, History of the parish of Trelawney (Kingston, Jamaica; 
privately printed, 1954) pp. 1-21.  Ogilvie had access to the vestry minutes of Trelawney parish before 
they were destroyed in 1926 when the court house in Falmouth burnt down. 
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shipping the second port of the island of Jamaica’.14  Three acts of the Jamaican 
legislature in 1794 and 1795 allowed the parish vestry to raise £10,000 in taxation for 
the construction of a church, parsonage and courthouse; to collect a tax from shipping 
for the maintenance of the harbour; and to make municipal regulations for policing, 
fire-watching, liquor licensing, street cleaning and refuse collection.15  The vestry was 
also granted the power to acquire land by compulsory purchase to convey water by an 
aqueduct from the river at Martha Brae for the use of the town.16  Another act in 1799 
allowed the vestry to appoint a force of nightwatchmen; to hire scavengers to clear the 
streets; to establish a marine hospital for sailors; and to set up markets for fish and 
beef.17  The town therefore saw rapid improvements calculated to make it a major 
trading centre in the island, at a moment when the traffic in sugar, rum, coffee, slaves, 
provisions and manufactures was reaching its peak, and when a temporary boost in 
profits provided by the destruction of sugar production in Saint Domingue after 1791 
had left local planters flush with cash and scrambling to find ways to develop their 
marginal lands to take advantage of this situation.18   
                                                 
14 The Library of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK [hereafter LB], Boulton and Watt Archives, MS 
3147/3/494/1a, Lawson to Boulton, 29 October 1799.  All quotations from the Boulton and Watt 
Archives are reproduced here by kind permission of The Library of Birmingham.  
15 35 Geo III c. 27, 28, 36.  (The Laws of Jamaica (7 vols., Kingston, Jamaica, 1822-4) vol. iii, 69-76, 
120-32) 
16 35 Geo III c. 36 (Ibid., vol. iii, 127-8) 
17 39 Geo III c. 11 (Ibid., vol. iii, 231-9) 
18 J.R. Ward, British West India slavery, 1750-1834: the process of amelioration (Oxford; Oxford 
University Press, 1988) pp. 39-60; Justin Roberts, Slavery and the Enlightenment in the British Atlantic 
(Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2013) pp. 26-160; Seymour Drescher, Econocide: British 
slavery in the era of abolition (Chapel Hill, NC; University of North Carolina Press, 2nd edition, 2010) 
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The failure of the new aqueduct, apparently for technical reasons, therefore 
left the new town and its shipping without any fresh water and seriously threatened its 
bid to keep pace with the expansion of trade.  ‘There is a river which runs near but is 
below the level of the town’, one resident explained, ‘and in consequence of the 
flowing of the side the water is [?brackish] for about a mile above the town, and there 
is not sufficient fall from whence the water can be conveyed within less than three 
miles and a half’, while the town itself was built on a marsh and could not sink 
wells.19  Local elites therefore secured an act of the assembly in November 1799 
incorporating the Falmouth Water Company, which proposed to address this issue by 
‘conducting, leading and conveying water from the said river into and through the 
said town of Falmouth’, and immediately faced some of the same technological 
challenges as their counterparts in Britain and the United States.20  An improved 
aqueduct sited at a more suitable part of the river would employ old and reliable 
technology, but because water generates friction as it travels through pipework and 
therefore requires even greater elevation and distance to overcome this, creating even 
more friction, it was calculated that nearly four miles of conduits would be required.21  
                                                 
pp. 113-41.  Ward (p. 48) suggests that profits in Jamaica rose from 6 to 13 per cent between 1792 and 
1798. 
19 LB, MS 3147/3/494/1a, Lawson to Boulton, 29 October 1799 and LB, MS 3147/3/494/3, Lawson to 
Boulton and Watt, 18 July 1800.  Ogilvie, Trelawney pp. 12-13, 42. 
20 40 Geo III c. 29, ‘An Act to constitute certain persons therein described a corporation or body 
politics for supplying the town of Falmouth in the parish of Trelawney, and the inhabitants thereof, and 
the shipping in the harbour of the said town, with good and wholesome water’ (Laws of Jamaica, vol. 
iv, 28-39).  Ogilvie suggests that the initiative came from important local elites in the parish vestry, 
who were behind these other measures for the development of the town: Ogilvie, History pp. 117-22. 
21 LB, MS 3147/3/494/1a, Lawson to Boulton, 29 October 1799 
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Since cast iron pipes cost more than five shillings per foot, a gravity-fed system 
would have cost between £5,000 and £6,000 for pipework alone.22  Clearly it would 
be better to find a site closer to Falmouth where the water could be lifted 
mechanically to a sufficient height, and the directors briefly considered building a 
chain pump or ‘Persian’ waterwheel turned by wind, cattle or even the force of the 
river itself, which would lift the water in buckets into a stone gutter and feed it into 
the pipework.23  Presumably the attraction was that these too were cheap and reliable 
pieces of technology that were widely used on sugar mills across the island.  The 
Jamaican planter and historian Bryan Edwards estimated that waterwheels for a large 
estate of roughly 600 acres cost about £1,000, including the construction of reservoirs, 
sluices and channels, of which about one-third was the cost of the waterwheel itself.24 
 However, one of the directors then suggested a third option: the hydraulic ram 
recently patented by Messrs Boulton and Watt and produced in the same Birmingham 
                                                 
22 This is calculated from the figures of £2,666 and £2,819 for two miles of cast iron pipe quoted by 
Boulton and Watt in February 1801: LB, MS 3147/3/494/11a, Boulton and Watt to Board of Directors, 
15 December 1800 and MS 3147/3/494/12, ‘Trial Estimate for Charge of Ram and Pipes’, c. 1800. 
23 LB, MS 3147/3/494/5, Board of Directors to Boulton and Watt, 19 July 1800.  Ogilvie therefore 
appears to have been mistaken in arguing that the Persian wheel was built here from the outset, but his 
conclusions have been repeated in subsequent work: Ogilvie, Trelawney p. 119; Jean Besson, Martha 
Brae’s two histories: European expansion and Caribbean culture-building in Jamaica (Chapel Hill, 
NC; University of North Carolina Press, 2002) pp. 76-8. 
24 Bryan Edwards, The history, civil and commercial, of the British colonies in the West Indies (3 vols., 
London, 1793-1801) vol. ii, 291-2.  For the cost of waterwheels in Britain, see Stanley Chapman, ‘The 
cost of power in the industrial revolution in Britain: the case of the textile industry’, Midland History, 1 
(1971) pp. 1-24.  For the incidence of water-mills in Jamaica, see B. W. Higman, Jamaica surveyed: 
plantation maps and plans of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Kingston, Jamaica; Institute of 
Jamaica Publications, 1988) pp. 81, 95, 102, 116-20, 123-5.   
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foundry which turned out their steam engines.  ‘Having seen an account of your 
apparatus and the method of raising water for which you have procured a patent’, 
James Lawson told them in October 1799, ‘I am induced to believe that, by means of 
it, water would be raised much higher than is here required, and that it would answer 
our purpose in a manner superior to any other [?apparatus]’.25  The hydraulic ram was 
(and is) a simple piece of machinery, invented by the Montgolfier brothers in France 
in 1797 with the Swiss inventor Francois-Pierre Amis Argand, who patented the 
apparatus in Britain and then sold the patent to Boulton and Watt (Figure 1).26  It uses 
a series of valves to place water under high pressure and then drive it out of the ram 
with sufficient force to push the water uphill and along several miles of pipes, offering 
a simple and reliable means of pumping water that would cost about £200 or £300 but 
have lower running costs than a Persian wheel.  The other directors were sceptical and 
their initial letter to Boulton and Watt declared that ‘unless you are morally certain of 
the efficiency of the ram for the purposes required, and unless you can warrant its 
having strength and durability’, they would use other methods.27 
 [Insert Figure 1 here] 
The directors were therefore reluctantly prepared to explore new technology in 
Jamaica in order to create a more effective outlet for the produce of their plantations, 
and also to explore its applications for irrigation and sugar milling at a time when the 
                                                 
25 LB, MS 3147/3/494/1a, Lawson to Boulton, 29 October 1799 
26 H.W. Dickinson, ‘Early years of the hydraulic ram’, Transactions of the Newcomen Society, 17 
(1936) pp. 73-83 
27 LB, MS 3147/3/494/1a, Lawson to Boulton, 29 October 1799 and MS 3147/3/494/5, Board of 
Directors to Boulton and Watt, 19 July 1800.  For the cost, see MS 3147/3/494/12, ‘Trial Estimate for 
Charge of Ram and Pipes’, c. 1800. 
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island was bringing even its marginal land under cultivation in order to take 
advantage of high sugar prices.28  Trials had taken place in Jamaica and Saint 
Domingue in the 1760s in using steam engines to pump water to feed irrigation 
ditches and millponds for sugar works, and parties in Falmouth were well aware that a 
successful experiment in the waterworks could help create a wider market for them 
among planters in the West Indies.29  ‘I am certain that, should one of your patent 
engines be ordered here under the direction of a competent person, it would be the 
means of creating a great demand for them from this country’, Lawson told Boulton 
and Watt, while the directors likewise noted that ‘there are at this moment many 
proprietors of estates who, having heard of the present correspondence, are anxiously 
waiting the result’.30  They intended, ‘should the ram be found to answer, to import 
several … to perform the work which they are now obliged to do by means of cattle, 
and the precarious and uncertain aid of windmills’.  Lawson’s letters suggest that both 
sides saw the waterworks as their chance to test the ram under local conditions and to 
address any technical issues before it was marketed more widely to planters.  ‘I chose 
to defer troubling you until the work was completed’, he told them in September 
1803, for example, ‘and until I might from experience give you a decisive [?report] 
upon the performance of your hydraulic ram’.31   
 Having received positive responses from their enquiries to Boulton and Watt, 
in July 1800 the committee appointed by the company placed its order for the 
                                                 
28 See above n. 18. 
29 Satchell ‘Steam power’ pp. 222-6; McClellan, Colonialism and science pp. 70-4 
30 LB, MS 3147/3/494/1a, Lawson to Boulton, 29 October 1799; LB, MS 3147/3/494/5, Board of 
Directors to Boulton and Watt, 19 July 1800. 
31 LB, MS 3147/3/494/28, Lawson to Boulton and Watt, 4 September 1803. 
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hydraulic ram and over two miles of six-inch diameter cast iron pipework to carry the 
water from the river to Falmouth, at a predicted cost of £2,500.32  Boulton and Watt 
began construction in December and contracted out with various nearby foundries for 
the pipework, though the rising price of cast iron made it necessary to increase the 
final price to nearly £3,800.33  Most of the order had been completed by August 1801 
and was shipped out from Liverpool and Bristol together with an engineer, William 
Clarke, nominated by Boulton and Watt to help set it up.  The major problems only 
began in 1802 when the company made its preparations for installation.  The original 
plan had been for the ram to sit about three miles from Falmouth near a waterfall on 
the Martha Brae, which would provide it with a sufficient head of water to drive the 
water along the pipes.34  Clarke boasted though ‘that he could make it work in a mill 
pond’ and sited the ram further downriver in a deep pond or basin with a set of sluices 
and gutters to direct water into the machine and carry away the surplus.  However, 
because there was not a sufficient elevation or fall between the inlets and outlets to 
the basin the ram lacked enough of a ‘head’ to push the water down the pipework.35  
‘The consequence was that when everything was completed and the sluices opened, 
the machine would not work at all’, noted Lawson, ‘to the great mortification of the 
friends of the undertaking and very much to the satisfaction of the opposers of it, who 
                                                 
32 LB, MS 3147/3/494/5, Board of Directors to Boulton and Watt, 19 July 1800. 
33 LB, MS 3147/3/494/11a, Boulton and Watt to Board of Directors, 15 December 1800 and MS 
3147/3/494/12, ‘Trial Estimate for Charge of Ram and Pipes’, c. 1800. 
34 LB, MS 3147/3/494/28, Lawson to Boulton and Watt, 4 September 1803. 
35 LB, MS 3147/3/494/30, Lawson to Boulton and Watt, 22 July 1804. 
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now prided themselves on their sagacity in having … predicted that the plan could 
never succeed’.36   
 It was therefore not enough simply to transmit technology to Jamaica.  As in 
Saint Domingue, Cuba or elsewhere in the Americas, inventions such as the steam 
engine or the vacuum pan had to be adapted to local economic and social conditions.  
Studies of steam power in these places by Satchell, Tomich, McClellan and others 
have stressed the myriad technical and mechanical skills that had to be imported or 
sourced locally in order to make it work, and the same was true of the hydraulic ram, 
but less attention has been paid to the institutional context.37  The transmission of new 
technology to the West Indies required not only skilled civil and mechanical engineers 
and artisans, as predicted by Mokyr, but also effective businessmen, lawyers and other 
professionals who could provide the organisational and financial framework needed to 
support this new technology.  The experience of the Falmouth Water Company shows 
that when the demand for new technology was sufficiently high, the slave society of 
Jamaica was able to supply these necessities and even to use them skilfully and 
imaginatively to overcome some of the obstacles created by the process of diffusion.   
 
-II- 
 
The most immediate issues facing the directors of the Falmouth Water Company were 
technological and mechanical.  The ram and its attendant structures had to be altered 
to generate enough water pressure, and without any assistance from William Clarke, 
who embodied the warning from Boulton and Watt that ‘but little confidence can be 
                                                 
36 LB, MS 3147/3/494/28, Lawson to Boulton and Watt, 4 September 1803. 
37 See above n. 4. 
‘Falmouth Water Company’ 
14 
 
placed in the sobriety and industry of workmen whom [are] removed from under our 
inspection’.38  Having ignored the recommendations of both the company and the 
manufacturers in locating the ram, ‘we found he had got to his ne plus ultra’, Lawson 
noted, ‘and could not even furnish us with a hint how to extricate us out of the present 
dilemma … [and] after the failure alluded to, we ceased to consult [him]’.39  Luckily 
the directors were able to draw on local expertise instead.  By 1804 about 40 per cent 
of the 800 plantations in the island used some form of water power to work the mills 
that ground sugar cane, and several plantations such as the Hope Estate in the parish 
of St Andrew’s near Kingston had built extensive aqueducts, creating a body of 
millwrights and civil engineers who were well versed in the practical aspects of 
hydraulic engineering.40  As in Philadelphia and New York, the waterworks could 
therefore ‘call upon the technical knowledge of a growing number of engineers who 
had learned to make surveys, take levels, construct watertight masonry, fashion steam 
engines, and build embankments, bridges and tunnels’.41 
The directors had already mooted building a dam in the river to increase the 
strength of the current and power the Persian wheel, so it was a simple matter to hire 
                                                 
38 LB, MS 3147/3/494/1a, Lawson to Boulton, 29 October 1799; MS 3147/3/494/5, Board of Directors 
to Boulton and Watt, 19 July 1800; MS 3147/3/494/11a, Boulton and Watt to Board of Directors, 15 
December 1800;, MS 3147/3/494/21, Stewart to Boulton and Watt, 5 September 1801; MS 
3147/3/494/22, Stewart to Boulton and Watt, 30 November 1801.  Similar problems were encountered 
when engineers were sent overseas to maintain steam engines: see Jennifer Tann, ‘Marketing methods 
in the international steam engine market: the case of Boulton and Watt’, Journal of Economic History, 
38 (1978) pp. 374-7 
39 LB, MS 3147/3/494/28, Lawson to Boulton and Watt, 4 September 1803. 
40 Satchell, ‘Early use of steam power’, p. 222 
41 Blake, Water for the cities p. 17 
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several engineers to construct a dam at the mouth of the basin Clarke had dug so as to 
build up a strong enough head of water to power the ram.  Lawson wrote happily in 
September 1803 that ‘the situation was favourable for the purpose, and the result of 
this means was equal to our most sanguine expectations’.42  The dam provided a 
sufficient head of water to enable the ram to pump the water nearly 40 feet uphill 
through two miles of pipework to the town of Falmouth, where it emptied into a stone 
reservoir in the town square capable of holding some 60,000 gallons.43  A further pipe 
and wharf carried it out to ships in the harbour but the population collected the water 
directly from the reservoir, a decision that spared the company the technological and 
commercial problems of piping water to individual homes, which Tomory has shown 
made such high demands on waterworks in London and Philadelphia.44  The trade-off, 
as noted below, were the financial problems that the company then experienced in 
collecting water duties.  The only civil engineering issue that remained was that the 
basin was now so deep that the ram was usually submerged in operation, and the basin 
had to be drained in order to effect repairs, ‘[which] is a very laborious process’, 
Lawson noted, ‘but on the whole we conceive that the deviations from the original 
intention have been in our favour, and had Mr Clarke himself had any notion of 
                                                 
42 LB, MS 3147/3/494/1b, Lawson to Boulton, 29 October 1799; MS 3147/3/494/5, Board of Directors 
to Boulton and Watt, 19 July 1800; MS 3147/3/494/28, Lawson to Boulton and Watt, 4 September 
1803. 
43 LB, MS 3147/3/494/28, Lawson to Boulton and Watt, 4 September 1803.  Ogilvie, Trelawney p. 58, 
119 
44 Many of the technological improvements described by Tomory and others were developed to address 
this specific problem: see above n. 10. 
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procuring a fall [of water] by means of a dam and not dug the basins so deep he might 
undoubtedly have claimed some merit from it’.45   
The successful adoption of the ram also required the application of local 
mechanical engineering skills to repair the frequent breakages that would otherwise 
have made it too unreliable to be economic to operate.  ‘The working gear (as must 
necessarily happen in any such machine) has occasionally broke’, Lawson reported, 
‘and the parts of it which are liable to friction wear a great deal’.46  The iron valves 
broke several times and the leather that maintained a watertight seal frequently had to 
be replaced.  The working gear gave way entirely in March 1804.  Once again the 
company was able to draw on local expertise to effect repairs and even improvements.  
The many plantations on the island were major industrial complexes, whose mills, 
boiling- and distilling-houses required very large numbers of carpenters, blacksmiths, 
bricklayers, millwrights and other mechanical artisans.  Skilled millwrights were 
particularly in demand, and the company’s agent in London noted in November 1801 
that ‘it is the most lucrative business in the mechanical line of any carried on there.  
Any man of moderate capacity, industry and sobriety must succeed in the business.’47  
B.W. Higman has estimated that by 1834 at least 6 percent of the slave population or 
18,000 people were tradesmen or artisans trained up by planters for this purpose.48  
The island also had several large foundries that specialised in repairing plantation 
                                                 
45 LB, MS 3147/3/494/30, Lawson to Boulton and Watt, 22 July 1804. 
46 LB, MS 3147/3/494/28, Lawson to Boulton and Watt, 4 September 1803. 
47 LB, MS 3147/3/494/22, Stewart to Boulton and Watt, 30 November 1801. 
48 B.W. Higman, Slave population and economy in Jamaica, 1807-1834 (Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press, 1976) pp. 37-9.  For white artisans, see Kamau Brathwaite, The development of 
Creole society in Jamaica, 1770-1820 (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1971) pp. 42-4 
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machinery, and combined European with African metallurgical expertise.49  Boulton 
and Watt were dismissive of their capacity, writing that there was no need to patent 
the ram in Jamaica ‘as the ram can only be beneficially manufactured where there are 
large iron works … [and] we are not apprehensive of rivalship from any other quarter 
[in Jamaica]’, but Satchell and Roper have argued that by the early nineteenth century 
the William James Foundry in Kingston had the capacity to cast parts for steam 
engines and mills in the island, a job requiring high levels of competence and skill, 
and they therefore ‘became strategically placed as a part of the support services of the 
sugar industry’.50  Like the foundries in the United States described by David Meyer 
and Richard Thompson, they may even have acted as important nodes for the transfer 
of mechanical skills and innovation in Jamaica.51 
 Indeed, the Falmouth Water Company was able to use these skills to venture 
beyond mere repairs to some improvements to the ram.  The failure of the iron valves 
was an irritation, they reported, ‘but having very good tradesmen on the spot we have 
been enabled to repair some of them, and have been advised to replace the iron valves 
with strong brass ones, which are already cast but not yet put on’.52  Lawson noted in 
his report to Boulton and Watt in July 1804 that the company had made other small 
                                                 
49 Candice L. Goucher, ‘John Reeder's foundry: a study of eighteenth-century African-Caribbean 
technology’, Jamaica Journal, 23 (1990) pp. 39-43; Veront Satchell and Shani Roper, ‘The William 
James Foundry 1817-43: an exposé of local metallurgical enterprise’, Industrial Archaeology Review, 
29 (2007) pp. 105-13. 
50 Satchell and Roper, ‘William James Foundry’, p. 112.  For Boulton and Watt, see LB, MS 
3147/3/494/11a, Boulton and Watt to Board of Directors, 15 December 1800. 
51 David R. Meyer, Networked machinists: high-technology industries in Antebellum America 
(Baltimore, MD; Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); Thomson, Structures of change pp. 129-59. 
52 LB, MS 3147/3/494/28, Lawson to Boulton and Watt, 4 September 1803. 
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modifications to the ram to cope with its frequent submergence in the basin and that 
by tweaking other parts it had been made both quieter and more efficient, though he 
also admitted that they still remained dependent on Boulton and Watt for any major 
technological improvements.53  ‘Permit me to request (as any knowledge we have of 
managing the machine is merely practical) that, should it appear to you from your … 
knowledge of the scientific principles upon which its power depends’, he had told 
them earlier in September 1803, ‘that you could furnish us with any instructions on 
the subject, which might facilitate or obviate the frequent occurrence of accidents’.54  
When the working gear gave way entirely in March 1804 the company consequently 
sent back the broken parts to Boulton and Watt to be completely redesigned.55   
 The slave society of Jamaica was therefore not in a position to drive forward 
major innovations or considerable technological alterations, but as in Cuba or Saint 
Domingue it could use the human resources generated by the plantation system to 
adapt new technologies such as the hydraulic ram to local conditions and even to 
provide some small incremental improvements or ‘micro-inventions’.  As Mokyr has 
noted, ‘effective use of technology … required not only access and incentives to 
create and access new technology but also the competence to make use of it and to 
carry out the “instructions” contained in the blueprint of the technique’, and the 
artisans of Jamaica were evidently as capable as those of Britain in producing ‘a 
cumulative flow of small, incremental, unrecorded but indispensable micro-inventions 
that adapted inventions to local needs and circumstances and made them work 
                                                 
53 LB, MS 3147/3/494/30, Lawson to Boulton and Watt, 22 July 1804. 
54 LB, MS 3147/3/494/28, Lawson to Boulton and Watt, 4 September 1803. 
55 LB, MS 3147/3/494/29a, Board of Directors to Boulton and Watt, 26 March 1804. 
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better.’56  The needs of sugar milling in the island produced sufficient civil and 
mechanical engineers and artisans with the skills to overcome the problems that the 
company faced, not least the limited skills of their metropolitan expert.  The next 
section will show that Jamaica was also capable of providing a suitable institutional 
matrix for the adoption of this new technology. 
 
-III- 
 
As noted at the start, the mechanical expertise necessary for technological diffusion 
had to be coordinated and deployed efficiently, and massive technological projects 
such as waterworks had to be financially sustainable.  Beginning with Sidney Pollard 
in the 1960s and continuing with the work of new institutional economists such as 
Daniel Bogart, the importance of proper structures and skills for managing these large 
corporate projects and regulating capital and credit has been recognised.57  One of the 
most important structures that reached maturity in Britain in the late seventeenth 
century was the joint-stock company, the direct ancestor of the modern corporate 
form, which combined a stable corporate structure with an open financial base.  The 
low barriers to investment enabled joint-stock companies to raise large amounts of 
money and spend it effectively in order to sustain major technological projects such as 
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canals, harbours, railways and public utilities.58  Tomory has shown that it was the 
standard format for waterworks in London in this period, though not in North 
America, where the greater political and financial demands required municipal 
enterprises with larger powers of taxation.59  Institutions therefore had to be aligned 
with local circumstances, but some form of corporate structure was necessary, and this 
section will argue that a slave society such as Jamaica could provide the Falmouth 
Water Company with the legal, political and financial resources to adapt technology 
such as the hydraulic ram successfully and make it economically viable. 
 The joint-stock company was a recent but not unfamiliar concept in Jamaica in 
1799, since one had been chartered by the house of assembly only a few years before 
to construct a breakwater at Montego Bay for the protection of shipping.60  The choice 
of a joint-stock company rather than a municipal corporation for the waterworks was 
probably influenced by the need to raise money without recourse to local taxation.  
There was no formal banking sector in the island with the resources to fund major 
capital projects, but by floating shares that offered not only dividends but also the 
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chance of capital gains the company was able quickly to find subscribers for the 
£20,000 it required.61  ‘A large sum is already subscribed for the purpose’, Lawson 
told Boulton and Watt in October 1799 before the bill of incorporation had even 
passed, and the company had probably raised around £4,000 or £5,000 by 1802, 
giving it the financial depth to accommodate spiralling costs.62  The directors had 
calculated in July 1800 that the ram and its pipework would cost at least £2,500 but 
the final total was closer to £3,800 as the price of cast iron increased.63  ‘Had the 
distance between us been less, we should have thought proper to wait your 
concurrence in this alteration’, Boulton and Watt wrote, ‘but considering how much 
time would be lost we have judged that we should best comply with your intentions 
by issuing the orders without delay’.64  The funds raised by the sale of shares 
therefore allowed the directors to cope with this unexpected increase in costs and to 
dispatch a further £1,200 in October 1801, as well as to absorb the further expenses of 
                                                 
61 There is currently no comprehensive study of sources of credit and investment at the turn of the 
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building and rebuilding the basin and dam thanks to Clarke’s mistakes.65  The final 
balance of £109 18s 8d due to Boulton and Watt was only finally paid off in August 
1805.66   
 The capacity of the Falmouth Water Company to adapt technology 
successfully to conditions in Jamaica also relied on securing and enforcing the legal 
powers needed to make the whole venture profitable.  The act of incorporation 
imposed a flat rate on property owners in Falmouth of two shillings for every pound 
of rental value for water, and six pence per ton of tonnage on ships watering in the 
harbour, and the company relied on collecting these sums to maintain its financial 
viability.67  Within a few years it was clear that defaulters were widespread and the 
company had to secure supplementary legislation from the assembly that tightened up 
procedures.68  The enacting legislation also allowed the company to purchase and 
hold land for the purpose of erecting pipes and reservoirs, including by compulsory 
purchase or eminent domain, and authorised its agents to trespass on neighbouring 
land for the purpose of construction and maintenance on making due satisfaction.69  
As in Britain and North America during the industrial revolution, where ‘it was 
virtually impossible to construct a waterworks system unless provision was made for 
taking property through the exercise of the right of eminent domain’, the wider 
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success of the water company and its technology depended on the capacity of the 
legislature to override private property rights in the public interest.70  The legislature 
also helped the company to police its new technology and prevent people tampering 
with the aqueducts, by creating fines of £500 for persons putting or placing ‘any earth, 
stones, ashes, dirt, dust, rubbish or filth of any sort, or anything else whereby the 
water may be polluted, injured or affected’, or damaging the pipes, aqueducts and or 
reservoirs.71  The power and support of the assembly was therefore a necessary 
precondition for the wider commercial success of the hydraulic ram. 
 Finally, individuals were important.  As will have become clear by now, James 
Lawson was instrumental in introducing the company to Boulton and Watt, pushed for 
the introduction of the hydraulic ram, and bullied the directors into persisting with it 
despite the initial failure in September 1803.  At a subsequent meeting of the board, 
the directors initially voted by a large majority to lay the ram aside.72  ‘Two only 
(myself being one), who had a confidence in the justness of the principle on which the 
ram was constructed … [and] prevailed with the others’, Lawson noted, ‘(as a heavy 
expence had been already incurred) to go a little further and try if a dam might not 
obviate all our disappointment’.73  He also dug deeper into his own pocket to support 
the project.  ‘The ignorance and blunder of Mr William Clarke had at one time 
                                                 
70 For the importance of compulsory purchase and legislative power in Britain and North America, see 
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rendered the completion of our undertaking so improbable that shares in our stocks 
were selling under par’, he noted, and to prevent confidence collapsing he had been 
forced to buy up another 40 or so shares, probably costing him around £200 or £300.74  
Individuals therefore exercised an important influence in Jamaica and elsewhere; as 
James McClellan has noted, the introduction of a steam engine to Saint Domingue in 
1786 to irrigate the Arbitonite region – ‘the most advanced application of technology 
to the problem of irrigation’ – was driven forward by a local planter and official, 
Bertrand de Saint-Ouen, and collapsed when he died the following year.75  They 
formed part of the wider matrix of institutional factors that did not differ in any real 
sense from those available in Britain or North America, and enabled the waterworks at 
Falmouth to turn their new technology into an effective and profitable investment. 
 
-IV- 
 
The experience of the Falmouth Water Company and its hydraulic ram between 1799 
and 1805 therefore shows that the island of Jamaica had the human and institutional 
capacity to support technological diffusion and innovation, not despite the plantation 
system and slave society but largely because of it.  ‘Our project from the beginning 
was by many considered visionary’, Lawson noted to Boulton and Watt in September 
1803, ‘[and] … your own experiences of the prejudices generally opposed to every 
public-spirited improvement, and the adoption of new invention will suggest to you 
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that it was not without much difficulty and the utmost persuasion that we have been 
enabled to bring our object to a happy termination’, but once this had been overcome 
through the efforts of James Lawson and others the resources of Jamaican society 
could be mobilised to bring the project to fruition.76  The crucial factor was the 
contribution that the ram might offer not only to the development of Falmouth but 
also by assisting irrigation and sugar milling in a period when planters in Jamaica 
were opening up marginal lands to take advantage of high sugar prices; as Gudmestad 
has noted, slavery could serve as a filter for the economic choices, made in this case 
by the planters and merchants of Falmouth.77  This eventually proved sufficient to 
overcome any lingering prejudice against new technology and to enable the normal 
operation of supply and demand to resume, by drawing on the civil and mechanical 
skills and human capital created by the plantation system and the legal and political 
structures that had evolved to help govern the slave society.  As in Cuba or Saint 
Domingue, planters in Jamaica were thus capable of considerable technological 
adaption and ambition when the proper combination of circumstances was found. 
This can best be demonstrated by the failure or reversal of technological 
diffusion across the Americas as either demand or supply fell out of alignment.  In 
New York, for example, the construction of the steam engine and pumps in the city in 
1774 was abandoned when war broke out two years later, and the city consequently 
relied on wells and horse-driven pumps until the early nineteenth century.78  Though 
the new steam engines initially proved workable in Philadelphia, their high running 
costs and uncertain reliability meant that they had to be replaced by a system of 
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waterwheels in 1822 at a cost of $430,000, which proved sufficient for the city for 
over 30 years.79  The technological and scientific advances in Saint Domingue were 
wiped out by an extended pattern of rebellion and warfare after 1791 and by the 
exclusion of the Haitian Republic from regular trade networks after 1804.  ‘The fact 
that Haiti in the nineteenth century was not the scientific or colonial center Saint 
Domingue had been in the eighteenth’, notes McClellan, ‘makes it clear that in this 
case at least, institutes of science marched at the vanguard, not the rear guard, of 
colonialism’.80  As one of the first towns in the western hemisphere to use machinery 
to pump water for urban consumption – beaten only by New York and Philadelphia – 
the town of Falmouth likewise had the potential to act as a crucial bridgehead for the 
wider diffusion of the technology of the hydraulic ram through Jamaica and the West 
Indies, but this was never achieved because both the demand for innovation and the 
capacity of the island to supply it very rapidly fell back out of alignment.81   
 Although the letters from the waterworks to Boulton and Watt ceased in 1805, 
there were already signs that demand for the ram might not meet the expectations that 
both sides had entertained.  Boulton and Watt agreed from the outset that the ram was 
particularly appropriate for the waterworks ‘under your peculiar circumstances’, but 
added that ‘we are of opinion there are but few situations in which the application of 
the steam engine might not be preferable.  It requires no head or fall of water … and 
the power of it is equally applicable to the raising of water for the purposes of 
irrigation and to the turning of all kinds of millwork and machinery’.82  Planters were 
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therefore encouraged to invest in the new steam engines, which were more flexible 
and useful, and presumably also more profitable for Boulton and Watt.  The years 
after 1815 also saw the economies of Jamaica and the British West Indies enter a slow 
but very prolonged decline in the face of competition from Cuba, Martinique and 
other regions in the Americas that had embraced technology such as the vacuum pan 
and enjoyed lower labour costs, leaving the planters in Jamaica with little money to 
spare for technologies such as the hydraulic ram that offered only marginal benefits in 
productivity or efficiency.83  Skilled labour grew scarcer and more expensive after the 
abolition of the slave trade in 1807, probably making it much harder to maintain the 
machinery of the waterworks.  By 1839 the company had long since replaced the ram 
with the simpler and perhaps more reliable chain pump or Persian wheel that they had 
first envisaged, though a steam engine was also installed in 1841 to assist this older 
technology when the level of the river fell too low.84  This wheel still stands in 
Falmouth today, at the basin where the hydraulic ram was installed in 1802, a 
reminder that technological diffusion could move backwards as well as forwards as 
the circumstances of slave societies such as Jamaica changed. 
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Figure 1: The Hydraulic Ram 
[See attached Figure1.jpg] 
Source: H.W. Dickinson, ‘The early years of the Hydraulic Ram’, Transactions of the 
Newcomen Society 17 (1936) p. 77, © The Newcomen Society for the Study of the 
History of Engineering and Technology, reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis 
Ltd, www.tandfonline.com, on behalf of The Newcomen Society for the Study of the 
History of Engineering and Technology. 
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